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Abstract: Mobility of sensor node in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) brings security
issues such as re-authentication and tracing the node movement. However, current security
researches on WSN are insufﬁcient to support such environments since their designs
only considered the static environments. In this paper, we propose the efﬁcient node
authentication and key exchange protocol that reduces the overhead in node re-authentication
and also provides untraceability of mobile nodes. Compared with previous protocols, our
protocol has only a third of communication and computational overhead. We expect our
protocol to be the efﬁcient solution that increases the lifetime of sensor network.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks; authentication; mobile node; untraceability; key
distribution
1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is the network that consists of light-weight battery-powered
devices with short-ranged wireless communication function. The devices have sensors that gather the
environmental information. After sensing the information, the devices send the information to the
networks. We deﬁne such devices as sensor node, and the core parts of the network as sinks and the
base station (Figure 1).
Authenticated key distribution in WSN is one of the fundamental security problems. Employing the
security protocols of other computer networks to WSN is insufﬁcient because the light-weight devicesSensors 2010, 10 4411
have limited resources. Thus, the most important issues in security researches on WSN are the design
of resource-efﬁcient security protocol. Several approaches such as key pre-distribution, pairwise key
agreement, group key based key agreement and hierarchical key management schemes were introduced
for the efﬁcient authenticated key distribution.
Zigbee [1] speciﬁes the key pre-distribution method that stores the master secret between two entities
for commercial application that also requires the large key storage management in scalable network.
The pairwise key agreement protocols based on the random key pre-distribution that enables to share
the pairwise key from the pre-distributed key pool are proposed in [2–4]. For the group key based key
agreement, Zhu et al. [5] showed the efﬁcient key distribution model with cluster key that enables the
reduced overhead of the base station. Recently, the hierarchical key management schemes, in which the
sensor nodes establish the hierarchy for the key distribution, are proposed by [6,7].
Figure 1. A dynamic mobile node continuously moves in the sensor networks that the static
sinks established. The unbroken line denotes the static connection between sinks and the
base station. The dotted line denotes the movement of the mobile node.
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However, since the above authenticated key management protocols only considered static
environments, they are not sufﬁcient to be applied to the advanced WSN with the mobile nodes. For
example, Wireless Sensor and Actor Network (WSAN) brings the concept of mobility as the extension of
WSN [8,9] . It is obvious that the wireless sensor network will be the combined network of static sensor
networkandthemobilesensorandactornetworks. Insuchenvironments, handlingalargeoverheadfrom
frequent node re-authentication requests due to the continuous node movements and the threats of tracing
the node movement are important security issues. Thus, efﬁcient re-authentication and untraceability are
important security requirements in WSN with mobile nodes. Although Fantacci et al. [10] studied the
possible presence of mobile node and proposed the authentication protocol supporting node mobility that
does not require any sink or base station for authentication and key distribution, their model still incurs
large communication overhead in node re-authentication.
Therefore, our motivation is to propose an efﬁcient node re-authentication and key distribution model
that reduces communication and computational overhead for node re-authentication. After claiming the
security issues in WSN with mobile nodes, we present the insufﬁciency of current authentication and key
distribution schemes to such environments. We then propose an efﬁcient untraceable re-authenticationSensors 2010, 10 4412
and key distribution protocol that can reduce the communication overhead between a sink and the
base station. Applying our protocol, a node previously authenticated by a sink can be efﬁciently
re-authenticated with less communication and computational overhead when the node changed position
and the node movement stays untraceable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy presents the drawbacks of previous
authentication and key distribution protocols supporting mobility in WSN and identiﬁes the security
requirements. Then, We propose the efﬁcient mobile node re-authentication protocol in Section 3,
and analyze the performance and security of our protocol in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes
this paper.
2. Issues of Mobile Node Authentication in WSN
In this section, we present the security problems on node mobility in WSN and the limits of previous
authentication and key agreement models. At ﬁrst, we show a sensor network model with mobile nodes
as in Figure 1. We deﬁne a static sensor node as Sink, a mobile node as Node, and the base station that is
the core network. The node has linear movements in the network. The base station and sinks are static,
which is the same as in Ibriq and Mahgoub’s model [7]. Sinks act as the gateway and link nodes to the
base station, and the base station is a kind of headquarter that manages the entire networks. When a node
initially joins the network, the node connects to a sink in the network and is authenticated by the sink
with the help of the base station. Afterwards, the node moves and reconnects to other sink. We assume
that the sink that re-authenticates the node is the neighbor sink of the sink that previously authenticated
the node. The re-authentication processes frequently happen because the node continuously moves in
the network.
In practical scenarios, re-authentication happens when a node lost connection to the sink or moved
and connected to other sink. For the former case, the node can be easily re-authenticated to the same sink
when the connection becomes available again. For the latter case, the node request the re-authentication
to other sink that is closest to the previously attached sink.
2.1. Previous Works on the Authenticated Key Agreement in WSN
Currently, most researches on the authentication and key distribution assume WSN as a static
environments. Thus, they only focused on the efﬁcient initial authentication and key setup.
Commercially deployed Zigbee [1] speciﬁes the key agreement architecture that pre-distribute keys.
In their architecture, each node pre-installs their unique keys, such as the master key (MK) and the link
key (LK), that are shared to other entities and the network key (NK) is shared to entire network by the
manufacturer. In order to support node mobility using the unique key, each node has to contain the key
as well as the number of nodes. Figure 2 shows the required keys in Zigbee. Seven keys (three MKs,
three LKs, and a NK) were required for the secure communication in the network with only four nodes.
Thus, deploying Zigbee in the large scale networks requires quite large storage for the key management.
In 2002, Eschenauer and Gligor [2] proposed the pairwise key agreement protocols based on the
random key pre-distribution that enables sharing the pairwise key from the pre-distributed key pool.
In the initial stage, each node stores m numbers of keys selected in a key pool. After the nodes areSensors 2010, 10 4413
deployed, each node shares the key information to its neighbor nodes. When the shared keys are found,
the node establishes the secure links between sinks that share the keys. After the links are established,
nodes generate the pairwise key with the sink that has no shared information via the secure link. Later,
Chan et al. [3] improved the model by generating the pairwise key from multiple numbers of shared key,
and Liu and Ning [11] proposed a model in which the pairwise key is not directly distributed but derived
by a bivariate polynomial. However, the networks cannot be completely connected by probabilistic
methods. The probability of failure increases in the case of irregular deployment of sensor nodes or
unpredictable interruptions.
Figure 2. Each node has to store seven keys in order to support mobile nodes in the network
with four sensor nodes under Zigbee. [1]
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Zhu et al. [5] introduced the group key based key agreement model that minimized threats of
compromised nodes. Every node has a unique key, pairwise keys with neighbor nodes, a cluster key
shared with all neighbor nodes, and the global key shared with the entire network. However, they only
assumed static networks.
In 2006, Abraham and Ramanatha [6] proposed an authentication and initial shared key establishment
model in hierarchical clustered networks. In 2006, Ibriq and Mahgoub [7] proposed an efﬁcient
hierarchical key establishment model with “partial key escrow table”. Using the key escrow table, a
sink can self-generate the shared key for the attached nodes. Figure 3 shows the brief model of [7].
However, any sinks have to maintain the information of every node in the table to support the node
mobility.
Fantacci et al. [10] proposed the distributed node authentication model that does not require the
base station as the centralized authenticator. Figure 4 shows the brief model with no centralized
authenticator. Every node shares the partial authentication information of each node based on Shamir’s
Secret Sharing Scheme [12], which enables node mobility support. When a node requests to be
authenticated to other node, the Node 2 is the authenticator, while other nodes such as Node 5 and
Node 6 are distributed authentication servers. However, the issue in this model is the overhead on
each node. Since the node has to participate in the authentication procedures as authenticator or an
authentication server, the computational and communication overhead can increase signiﬁcantly with
frequent authentication requests.Sensors 2010, 10 4414
Huang et al. [13] proposed self-organizing algorithm by using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
Once the certiﬁcates are issued to nodes, nodes can self-establish the pairwise key by exchanging
the certiﬁcates with any node. Even though the public key based security architecture requires more
advanced computational power and resources, efﬁcient applications for the sensor networks will be
available in near future with light weight implementation such as TinkPK [14] and TinyECC [15].
Figure 3. Ibriq and Mahgoub’ model [7]: The intermediate Sink 1 stores the partial key
escrow table that stores the partial information of nodes. After the requests from nodes are
received, Sink 1 request the authentication ticket to the base station. After receiving the
ticket, Sink 1 authenticates and share keys with nodes.
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Figure 4. Fantacci et al.’s model [10]: When Node 1 request to join the network, Node 2 acts
as the authenticator. Other nodes act as authentication server. In the initial setup of network,
all node share the partial information of each node. When a node request to be authenticated,
they gather the authentication information using secret sharing.
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2.2. Drawbacks of Previous Protocols Supporting Mobile Node
2.2.1. Frequent Re-authentication
Since the sensor has battery of limited power and low-end processor with short-range wireless
communication, reducing communication and computational overheads is important to increase the
lifetime of the sensor. However, the mobile sensor node may incur large overhead for security
computation due to the frequent requests of node re-authentication. When a node connects to a sink, the
sink has to authenticates the node. Afterwards, the node will connect to another sink after the movement,
and the new sink has to authenticate the node again. If the node moves continuously, the authentication
process will also occur repeatedly. It is obvious that the frequent re-authentication processes signiﬁcantly
drain the resources in battery-based sensor nodes.
Current authentication and key distribution protocols lacks the consideration of node mobility and
are thus insufﬁcient to be applied in such environment. Using the current protocols such as [7], the
communication pass (1)-(2)-(3)-(4) is required for the initial authentication and key distribution in
Figure 5. When the node moves and reconnects to sink 2, the communication pass (5)-(6)-(7)-(8) is
required for authentication and key distribution, which have the similar communication overhead to the
initial authentication. Such overhead will create huge problem in the environment where large numbers
of nodes moves frequently. Thus, the reduction of computational and communication overheads in
re-authentication are very urgent requirement for the node mobility support in the WSN.
Figure 5. Communication pass: initial authentication (1)-(2)-(3)-(4), re-authentication
(5)-(6)-(7)-(8). The unbroken line denotes the static connection, and the dotted line denotes
the movement of the node.
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2.2.2. Tracing Node Movements
Considering the mobility of sensor nodes, the tracking of node movement is one of the possible
attacks. For example, when the mobile nodes are deployed in battle ﬁelds, the tracking by enemies
is of signiﬁcant threat to the networks. Also, tracking node movement threats privacy. Thus, theSensors 2010, 10 4416
authentication and key agreement protocols should provide the privacy of the mobile node. Current
protocols do not consider the mobility of the node.
2.3. Security and Privacy Requirements
We deﬁne the security requirements as follows. We assume that when the node N communicates with
a sink S2 after disconnection to the sink S1, S1 cannot receive any message between N and S2. S2 is one
of neighbor sinks of S1.
Re-authentication An authenticated node N and S2 should be able to identify each other with less
communication and computational overhead than in the initial authentication.
Untraceability In re-authentication of N, S2 only identiﬁes that N was previously connected to S1, and
never traces the direction of N.
In addition to the requirements of “re-authentication” and “untraceability”, we also deﬁne the
fundamental security requirements as follows.
Conﬁdentiality When N and S1 are operating initial authentication, nobody can know the
communication packet between N and S1, between S1 and BS. For re-authentication between
N and S2, nobody except S1 can know the communication information, while S1 out of
communication range.
Message Authentication Any malicious adversaries should not be able to forge the communication
packet.
Key Freshness N and S should be able to verify that the key is generated during the current session.
Node/Sink Resiliency Even N, S1 or S2 are compromised by a malicious adversary, they should not be
able to affect to the entire network.
“Conﬁdentiality”, “message authentication”, and “key freshness” are important requirements to protect
against the attacks such as the replay attack or man-in-the-middle attack. “Node/Sink resiliency” is a
practical threat as the sensor nodes are generally deployed in the environment out of administration.
3. Proposed Protocol
Inthissection, weproposeournovelauthenticationandkeydistributionschemethatprovidesefﬁcient
mobile node re-authentication and untraceablity. In Section 3.1, we brieﬂy overview the overall process
of proposed protocol. In Section 3.2, we introduce the concept of “authentication ticket” that enables
fast re-authentication. After that, we show our efﬁcient node re-authentication protocol in Section 3.3.
3.1. Overview of Proposed Protocol
We brieﬂy describe the procedure of our proposed protocol in Figure 6. Assume that there are a
base station BS, a sink S1, a neighbor sink S2, and a mobile node N in the network. We deﬁne the
neighbor sink as the sink that is in the 1 hop communication range. S1 periodically broadcasts HELLOSensors 2010, 10 4417
in Phase 0. When S2 receives HELLO, S2 initiates the neighbor relationship if S1 is a newly discovered
sink. After the pairwise key between S1 and S2 has been exchanged in Phase 1, S1 and S2 exchange
the authentication key that is used to verify the authenticated user in Phase 2. Phase 1 and Phase 2 are
only required during establishing the static sensor network. We let the establishment of the static sensor
network follow any previous protocol, such as [7].
When N ﬁrst joins the network, N may be connected to S1 in the network, as in Figure 6. After
receiving HELLO of S1, N initiates the initial authentication with S1 in Phase 3. After N is authenticated
S1, N only needs the re-authentication in Phase 4 when N continuously moves and request the
authentication again. The authentication process in Phase 3 is only necessary when the re-authentication
fails in certain case, e.g., when the neighbor sink is not available.
Figure 6. Protocol overview: Upon receiving HELLO of Sink 2 (S2), (a) Sink 1 (S1)
mutually authenticates Sink 2 (Phase 1), and shares the authentication key (Phase 2). (b)
Node is initially authenticated by Sink 1 (Phase 3), and requests re-authentication to Sink 2.
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3.2. Authentication Ticket
The “Authentication Ticket” is used for the node re-authentication. When a node requests
authentication to a sink, the sink generates the authentication ticket and sends it to the node. The
authentication ticket can be veriﬁed by the authentication key that is given to the neighbor sinks. Using
the authentication ticket, the node movement is untraceable. Veriﬁcation of the authentication ticket is
available to neighbor sinks of the sink that issued the ticket. We adopt the idea of “cluster key” in [16]
that shared to neighbor sinks. The main difference is that the cluster key in [16] is used for broadcast
communication in the cluster, while the key in our protocol is used for verifying the authentication ticket.
Thus, we rename the key as “authentication key” because of its different use in the protocol. Figure 7
shows that neighbor sinks of Sink 1 (S1) shares the authentication key AKS1.Sensors 2010, 10 4418
Figure 7. Sink 1 shares AKS1 to neighbor sinks. When N is authenticated by Sink 1, any
neighbor sinks can re-authenticate N.
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3.3. Protocol Description
The protocol consists of ﬁve phases as follows: Phase 0 The common neighbor discovery,
Phase 1 Neighbor sink relationship set up, Phase 2 Neighbor group authentication key share,
Phase 3 Initial node authentication, and Phase 4 Node re-authentication.
The notations used in the protocol are deﬁned in Table 1. Key IKN is the integrity key derived from
KN, where IKN = KDF(KN). KDF is an one-way key derivation function. We can also use a hash
function for KDF.
Table 1. Notation
Term Description Term Description
BS Base Station Etfmg Encrypt arbitrary message m using t
hfmg Hash arbitrary message m MACt(m) Message Authentication Code using t
TS Time stamp KN Pre-shared key between N and BS
IKN IK derived from KN KS Pre-shared key between S and BS
IKS IK derived from KS SK Shared session key between sinks
SIK IK derived from SK AKS Group Authentication Key of Sink
AIKS IK derived from AKS NK Shared session key between S and N
NIK IK derived from NK IK Integrity Key
3.3.1. Phase 0: Neighbor Discovery
A sink S1 periodically generates a random nonce R0 . S1 also generates u0 = EKS1fR0jjTS0g and
v0 = MACIKS1(S1jjHELLOjju0), where TS0 is time stamp. u0 and v0 are included in the HELLO
message as in Figure 8. Then S1 broadcasts u0 and v0 as follows:
S1 ! Broadcast : S1jjHELLOjju0jjv0Sensors 2010, 10 4419
Phase 0 is the periodical common procedure. When a sink receives HELLO, the sink initiates Phase 1 or
Phase 2. When a node receives HELLO, the node initiates Phase 3 or Phase 4.
Figure 8. Neighbor discovery (Phase 0): sink periodically broadcasts HELLO.
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3.3.2. Phase 1: Neighbor Sink Relationship Set Up
Assume another sink S2 receives HELLO message. S2 checks whether the sender of HELLO S1 is
known or not. If S2 already knows S1, S2 discards the message. Otherwise, S2 requests to set up the
neighbor relationship as follows:
P-1.a. S2 randomly selects R1 and generates u1 = EKS2fR1jju0g, v1 = MACIKS2(S2jjBSjjS1jju1jjv0).
S2 ! BS : S2jjBSjjS1jju1jjv1jjv0
P-1.b. After verifying v1, BS decrypts u1 and retrieves R1 and u0. Then, BS veriﬁes v0
and decrypts u0. Finally, BS retrieves R0 and TS0 . BS generates and sends u4, v4, and v3
to S2 where,u3 = EKS1fR1jjh(TS0)g, v3 = MACIKS1(BSjjS1jju3), u4 = EK2fR1jju3g and
v4 = MACIK2(BSjjS2jjR1jju4jjv3)
BS ! S2 : BSjjS2jjS1jju4jjv4jjv3
P-1.c. After verifying v4, S2 decrypts u4, and retrieves R1 and u3. S2 generates
KS1S2 = KDF(0jjR0jjR1) and IKS1S2 = KDF(1jjR0jjR1) with R0 and R1. KS1S2 is encryption key
and IKS1S2 is integrity key between S1 and S2. Then S2 generates v5 = MACIKS1S2(S2jjS1jjR0jjR1)
and sends u3, v3, and v5 to S1.
S2 ! S1 : S2jjS1jju3jjv3jjv5
P-1.d. After verifying v3, S1 decrypts u3 and retrieves R1. S1 also generates KS1S2 and IKS1S2. Then
S1 veriﬁes v5. S1 generates v6 = MACIKS1S2(S1jjS2jjACKjjR0jjR1) and sends v6 with ACK to S2.
S1 ! S2 : S1jjS2jjACKjjv6
P-1.e. S2 veriﬁes v6 and shares pairwise keys KS1S2 and IKS1S2.Sensors 2010, 10 4420
Figure 9. Neighbor group authentication key share (Phase 2): sinks share neighbor sink’s
authentication keys.
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3.3.3. Phase 2: Neighbor Group Authentication Key Share
Phase 2 can be operated solely or after Phase 1 is completed. In Phase 2, S1 initiates following
procedures.
P-2.a. S1 randomly selects two nonces ASEEDS1 and R1. Then S1 generates
u1 = EKS1S2fASEEDS1jjR1g and v1 = MACIKS1S2(S1jjS2jju1).
S1 ! S2 : S1jjS2jju1jjv1
P-2.b. After verifying v1, S2 decrypts u1, and retrieves ASEEDS1 and R1. Then S2 generates
AKS1 = KDF(0jjASEEDS1) and AIKS1 = KDF(1jjASEEDS1). S2 also generates
v2 = MACAIKS1(S2 jjS1jjACKjjAR1) using AIKS1.
S2 ! S1 : S2jjS1jjACKjjv2
P-2.c. S1 veriﬁes v2.
After the Phase 2 is completed, sinks share their neighbor sink’s authentication keys as in Figure 9.
3.3.4. Phase 3: Initial Node Authentication
When N receives HELLO that S1 broadcasts in Phase 0 and is not yet authenticated by any sink, N
proceeds followings.
P-3.a. Node N randomly selects R1 and generates u1 = EKNfR1jju0jjv0g and
v1 = MACIKN(N1jjS1jju1).
N ! S1 : NjjS1jju1jjv1
P-3.b. S1 generates v2 = MACIKS1(S1jjBSjjNjju1jjv1).
S1 ! BS:S1jjBSjjNjju1jjv1jjv2
P-3.c. After verifying v2 and v1, BS decrypts u1, and retrieves R0, u0 and v0. After verifying v0, BS
decrypts u0, and retrieves R0 and TS. BS checks the validity of TS and generates u3 = EKNfR0g,
v3 = MACIKN(BSjjNjjS1jju3), u4 = EKS1fR1jju3jjv3g and v4 = MACIKS1(BSjjS1jjNjjR0jju4).
BS ! S1 : BSjjS1jjNjju4jjv4Sensors 2010, 10 4421
P-3.d. After verifying v4, S1 decrypts u4, and retrieves R1, u3 and v3. Then S1 generates
NKN = KDF(R0jjR1). S1 generates t = EAKS1fTSjjR1jjNKNg and w = MACAIKS1(Njjt). Next,
S1 also generates u5 = ENKNfTSjjtjjwg and v5 = MACNIKN(S1jjNjjR0jju5).
S1 ! N : S1jjNjju3jjv3jju5jjv5
P-3.e. After verifying v3, N decrypts u3 and retrieves R0. Then N also generates NKN and veriﬁes v5.
N decrypts u5 and retrieves TS, t and w. N generates v6 = MACNKN(NjjS1jjACKjjR0jjR1).
N ! S1 : NjjS1jjACKjjv6
P-3.f. S1 veriﬁes v6.
3.3.5. Phase 4: Node Re-Authentication
When N receives HELLO that S2 broadcasts in Phase 0 and is previously authenticated by a sink, N
proceeds followings.
P-4.a. N generates v1 = MACNIKN(NjjS2jjtjjwjjv0).
N ! S2 : NjjS2jjtjjwjjv1
P-4.b. S2 veriﬁes w and decrypts t. S2 retrieves R1, NKN and TS. Using NKN, S2 veriﬁes v1. Then S2
generates NK0 = KDF(R1jjR0), also generates t0 = EAKS2fR1jjNK0
Ng and w0 = MACAIKS2(Njjt0).
S2 generates v2 = h(NK0
NjjR0) and u3 = ENKNfR0jjv2jjt0jjw0g, v3 = MACNIKN(S2jjNjju3).
S2 ! N : S2jjNjju3jjv3
P-4.c. After verifying v3, N decrypts u3 and retrieves R0, v2 , t0 and w0. Then N generates NK0
N and
veriﬁes v2. N generates v4 = MACNIK0
N(NjjS2jjACKjjR0jjR1).
N ! S2 : NjjS2jjACKjjv3
P-4.d. After verifying v4, S2 authenticates N.
Brief procedures of Phase 3 and Phase 4 are shown in Figure 10.
4. Analysis
In this section, we show the performance and security analysis of our protocol. Section 4.1 shows the
comparison to the previous protocols, and Section 4.2 shows the security analysis for the requirements
and known attacks in WSN.
4.1. Performance Analysis
For the performance analysis, we compared the number of communication passes, the required
message sizes, and the number of computation of the protocol. We do not count the overhead in Phase
0, since Phase 0 does not initiate the protocol. The node just ignores Phase 0 when the node receives
HELLO from the sink that already authenticated the node.Sensors 2010, 10 4422
Figure 10. Phase 3: Node requests initial authentication to Sink 1. Phase 4: Node requests
re-authentication to Sink 2
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Table 2. Comparison of required communication pass for re-authentication.
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4.1.1. Communication Pass
We compared the required number of communication passes with Fantacci et al.’s model [10] and
Ibriq and Mahgoub’s model [7]. The reason is that [10] considered node mobility without requiring sinks
or base station in the key distribution, and [7] showed the efﬁcient key distribution in static networks.
Table 2 shows the comparison of communication passes for node re-authentication, where n denotes the
number of nodes and t denotes the number of sinks. Since nodes act as the authentication server (the
base station) and the authenticator (the sink), all the communications in [10] are operated among nodes.
Comparison of required number of communication pass in initial authentication is the same as the
previous models. In node re-authentication, our novel protocol has much more efﬁciency compared with
other protocols [7,10], since our protocol does not require the communication with the base station in
re-authentication.
In practical application, we can deploy the network that all nodes directly connect to any sinks
(i.e., n = 1). In that case, the communication passes in our protocol are just three passes
(challenge-response-conﬁrmation).
4.1.2. Message Size
WecomparedAbrahamandRamanatha’smodel[6,7]fortherequiredmessagesizeforauthentication.
Based on the results in [6], we approximately compared the message sizes based on the message sizeSensors 2010, 10 4423
with MAC size as 4 bytes, the time stamp as 8 bytes, nonce as 8 bytes, and key size as 16 bytes. We also
set the source and target IDs as 1 byte, respectively.
Tables 3 and 4 show the message sizes in the initial authentication and the message sizes in
re-authentication with 2 hops between sink and base station, respectively. Table 3 shows that the
performance for the initial authentication is similar to other protocols. In initial authentication (Phase 3),
Abraham and Ramanatha’s model [6] showed the best result—30 bytes less in message sizes than our
protocol. However, as Table 4 shows, our protocol achieves about a third overall message size than other
protocols. Even when we increase the size of each parameter, our protocol is still much more efﬁcient
than any other protocols in node re-authentication.
Table 3. Comparison of required message size for initial authentication (bytes).
Abraham’s model [6] Ibriq and Mahgoub’s model [7] Proposed
Node to Sink 46 68 56
Sink to Sink 70 76 62
Sink to Base station 70 76 66
Base station to Node 92 188 180
Total message size 278 408 302
Table 4. Comparison of required message size for re-authentication (bytes).
Abraham’s model [6] Ibriq and Mahgoub’s model [7] Proposed
Node to Sink 46 68 44
Sink to Sink 70 76 -
Sink to Base station 70 76 -
Base station to Node 92 188 64
Total message size 278 408 108
For the comparison in multi-hop environments, Figures 11 and 12 show the message sizes of initial
authentication (Phase 3) and re-authentication (Phase 4) in our protocol and the comparison with other
protocols, respectively. When the hop distances between the sinks to which the node is attached and the
base station increase, the required message size and the communication pass also increase.Sensors 2010, 10 4424
Figure 11. Comparison of message sizes with initial authentication and re-authentication
per hop distance from sink to the base station increases.
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Figure 12. Comparison of message sizes with [6] and [7] per hop distance between a sink
and a base station
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4.1.3. Computation
Now, we compare the computational overhead of initial authentication (Phase 3) and re-authentication
(Phase 4). In total, 10 times of encryption/decryption and 14 times of MAC generation/veriﬁcation
are required for initial authentication, while 4 times of encryption/decryption and 10 times of MAC
generation/veriﬁcation are required for re-authentication. For node speciﬁc operation, 3 times of
encryption/decryption for initial authentication, 1 time of encryption/decryption are required. Both cases
require 4 times of MAC generation/veriﬁcation. Since the computation of MAC does not have signiﬁcant
overhead, comparing the computation of encryption and decryption, our computation is 2–3 times more
efﬁcient. The comparison of computation is shown in Table 5. We do not measure the computation time
of each operation that depends on the encryption and hash algorithms in this paper. Note that we can
apply TinySEC [17] and TinyHash [18] for the implementation.Sensors 2010, 10 4425
Table5. Comparison of computation between initial authentication and re-authentication (times).
Initial Authentication Re-authentication.
Encryption/Decryption in Total 10 4
Encryption/Decryption by Node 3 1
MAC Generation/Veriﬁcation in Total 14 10
MAC Generation/Verﬁcation by Node 4 4
4.2. Security Analysis
We show the security analysis of our protocol that holds the requirements deﬁned in
Section 2.3. “re-authentication”, “untraceability”, “conﬁdentiality”, “message integrity”, “key
freshness”, and “node/sink resiliency”. Then, we analyze the security of our protocol against
known attacks.
4.2.1. Re-Authentication
After a node N is initially authenticated by a sink S1 in phase 3, the node receives the
authentication ticket (t;w) and v1, where t = EAKS1fTSjjR1jjNKNg, w = MACAIKS1(Njjt) and
v1 = MACNIKN(NjjS2jjtjjwjjv0). When N moves and requests re-authentication to the neighbor sink
S2, S2 can veriﬁes (t;w) since the authentication key of S1, AKS1 is shared to S2. N can authenticates
S2 with u3 and v3 with NKN. Finally, S2 authenticates N after veriﬁcation of v4. In the re-authentication
phase, the base station is not involved.
4.2.2. Untraceability
A sink S1 issues the authentication ticket (t;w) to a node N. However, S1 does not know the next
move of N. N can be re-authenticated by any neighbor sinks of S1. For the re-authenticated sink S2, S2
only knows that N was previously authenticated by S1, but never knows the direction N ahead. Sinks
only know N was previously authenticated by neighbor sinks, but never predict N’s next direction as in
Figure 13.
4.2.3. Conﬁdentiality
Any sinks and nodes pre-share secret keys only with the base station. For the Neighbor discovery
phase, the neighbor discovery message is encrypted using KS that is only shared between a sink and
the base station. For setting up the neighbor group and node authentication, the adversary requires
shared secret key to know the information. For the node re-authentication, the responses u3 and v3 are
encrypted using NKN that is known to S1. However, we assume that the re-authentication happens,
where S1 cannot involve in the communication from out-of-reach.Sensors 2010, 10 4426
Figure 13. When N move in the networks, sinks re-authenticate N without knowing the
node’s direction.
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4.2.4. Message Authentication
In our protocol, every packet is protected by 4 bytes MAC. The outside adversary should be able
to forge the message to succeed in the attack. The security of the MAC depends on the security of
the hash function. The recommended MAC size in [17] is 4 bytes for practical application, since only
40 forgery attempts per second are available on a 19.2 kb/s channel while 231 trials are required for
successful forgery. However, the performance of communication channel is increasing, and the size of
MAC should be increased in future applications. Recently the efﬁcient implementation of hash functions
is introduced in [18]. Thus, our protocol is secure against the man-in-the-middle attack, as the adversary
has no efﬁcient way to forge MAC even when the part of the network is compromised by the attacker.
4.2.5. Key Freshness
In Phase 0, the sink S1 periodically generates random nonce R0. Thus, S1 can verify that the requests
of authentication are from the directly linked sinks or nodes. In Phase 1, two entities generate the
random nonces whose freshness can be checked by both entities. In Phase 2, S1 also generates random
nonce R1 for the freshness check. In Phase 3 and 4, the node also generates random nonce R1 to check
the freshness.
4.2.6. Node/Sink Resiliency
We can deﬁne two kinds of threat of sink capture: the sink missing case and the compromised sink
case. When a sink S1 is just missing, the node will lose the connection S1 and ﬁnd other sink such as S2.
Thus, we only need to consider the compromised sink case.
When the sink is compromised, we can assume that the keys in the sink are leaked. However, even
if the group authentication key is leaked, only will the neighbor sinks be affected. The compromised
sink can self-attach the fake nodes that will request re-authentication without initial authentication. ForSensors 2010, 10 4427
this case, we add h(KNjjR1) in the authentication ticket that is sent to the sink when the node requests
re-authentication. For suspicious nodes, the sink can check if the node is genuine with help of the
base station. Also, we need to deﬁne the security policy for the extreme abnormality in deploying
sensor network application. When the node is compromised, we can deﬁne that the compromised node
may try to know the information of the sinks or impersonate other nodes. However, the compromised
node will fail in both cases, since the node does not share any information in the protocol. Thus,
our protocol has node and sink resiliency, and is practically secure against selective forwarding and
acknowledgement spooﬁng.
4.2.7. Security Against Known Attacks
We analyze the security of our protocol against the attacks identiﬁed in [19]. Since the static parts
in the networks could follow the previous models such as [7], we only focus on the security of node
re-authentication in this section.
The sinkhole attack against our protocol fails without knowing the keys. An adversary A may capture
the authentication ticket (t;w) that N initially sent to S2, and A send (t;w) to S2 or other sink S5 that
is also a neighbor sink of S1. However, A fails in such attack without knowing AKS1. Wormhole attack
on our protocol fails since the adversary cannot send the conﬁrmation message. Spoofed, altered or
replayed routing information attack also fail without knowing the encrypted nonce in our protocol. To
succeed in the replay attack, the adversary has to be able to re-use the intercepted packet. We do not
consider relaying through the attackers as successful attack. Sybil attack also fails from veriﬁcation of
identity of nodes through sinks and the base station. As for HELLO ﬂood attacks, we can apply the
global key shared to all entities in the network that many researches such as [7,16] used for the efﬁcient
message broadcast and DoS attack protection.
5. Conclusions
Node mobility is one of the emerging issues in WSN that needs to be adequately addressed. In
this paper, we outlined the drawbacks of previous authentication protocols supporting mobile nodes
in WSN, and identiﬁed the following requirements: efﬁcient node re-authentication and untraceability.
We then proposed our novel efﬁcient node authentication and key distribution protocol that provides
re-authentication and untraceability. Also, we analyzed our protocol by comparing it with the previous
protocols. Our protocol requires only three passes of communication with one third of communication
message sizes compared with previous protocols in node re-authentication. The computational overhead
of node re-authentication of a single mobile node achieves about 2–3 times more efﬁciency than that
of initial node authentication. It is obvious that deploying our protocol in the environment with large
numbers of mobile nodes will achieve much higher cost efﬁciency than any previous methods. Our
future plan is to gain the energy efﬁciency of sensor network in the initial authentication process of our
protocol. Thus, We expect that our proposed protocol will be the efﬁcient security solution supporting
mobile nodes in WSN.Sensors 2010, 10 4428
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